2024-02

2024-02, Discussion Papers, Comments, Book Reviews

Not Your Everyday Objects

Preview: /Review: Graham Harman and Christopher Witmore, Objects Untimely: Object-Oriented Ontology and Archaeology, (Cambridge and Hoboken: Polity Press, 2023), 240 pages./ This is a very unusual book and it is so in several different respects. Firstly, it is co-authored and that already makes it a rare bird in contemporary philosophical output. Secondly, the author duo […]

2024-02, Forum

The Problem of Being Someone

Abstract: There is a genuine and profound problem about what it consists in for anything to be yourself. Once (perhaps per impossibile) all the empirical and modal facts about a particular human being are in, it still remains unexplained both what being you is, and why that human being is yourself. Being you seems an

2024-02, Thematic Section

The Saving Order of Science: New Atheist Sam Harris’s Scientism is not Fundamentalism but Affective Attachment to a Salvific Epistemology

Abstract: The New Atheist movement has been called “fundamentalist” in its allegiance to science. While true that New Atheism is remarkable among the various historical formations of atheism for its championing of the sciences, it is not fundamentalist. Where it does share a resemblance to Christian fundamentalism is in their respective attachments to a salvific

2024-02, Editorial

Religion and the Life-World

Preview: This special issue of Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture follows on from the double special issue on Science and Religion published at the end of last year. This double issue focused primarily on questions in metaphysics and ontology. What several of the contributions have pointed out, however, is that the naturalistic worldview,

2024-02, Forum

Ontology or Practice? An Ingardenian Examination of Crittenden’s Ficta

Abstract: In this article, I analyze Charles Crittenden’s account of fictional objects in his Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects (1991). I argue that Crittenden’s sketchy ontology of fictional objects does not support his weak eliminativism. Going along the lines of Amie Thomasson (1999), I stress that the problem of fictional objects is a strictly

Scroll to Top